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It is often said that the emotions, intimacy and intensely personal relationships 
associated with families make disputes about them particularly amenable to 
personalised, private decision-making. We want the law to respect our individual and 
relational choices about with whom we choose to live and/or rear children. And when 
our relationships end or change, we expect to have some say in the terms and 
consequences of that change. The law that forges the principles and processes by 
which we reach those terms and assess those consequences must therefore take 
some account of our choices and when appropriate support us to design and 
implement them. Yet there is on the other hand more than one aspect of family living 
which renders disputes about it less rather than more amenable to private, 
personalised decision-making.  
 
The family is still one of the most gendered of social and legal institutions and ‘doing’ 
family 1  is about negotiating those familial relations constructed by ‘choice’ or 
otherwise. Whether traditional gender roles are reinforced in those negotiations or 
are subverted, they exist, they are noticed and they are often remarked upon in law 
even within non-normative families.  Family law therefore can be argued to be about 
gendered familial roles; it is about mothers, fathers, husbands and wives, despite the 
law’s belated recognition of non-normative families and its degendered language of 
‘partner’, ‘parent’ and ‘spouse’. Much of family law is thus about providing justice in 
determining the consequences of relations between gendered subjects in the privacy 
of the home. But in this way it is also about determining the consequences of those 
relations in public civil and political society. As the House of Lords said, for example, 
the justice of fairness in financial orders must be measured against social values 
including non-discrimination and equality (White v White2) and as the President told 
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us in Re G3, so must the meaning, or justice, of welfare. So, while family privacy is 
important, as is our freedom to choose how to live in and out of our families of choice, 
these manifestations of our choices can not be detached from legal principles 
developed to take account of the public, social context in which they are made and 
experienced or from the social and political consequences they engender. Family 
law is about determining what it means, both privately and publically, to be a mother, 
father, son, daughter, partner, husband or wife.4 These meanings are as important 
socially as they are to the individuals concerned. For reasons of gender and 
generational justice, therefore, publicity and transparency in determining these 
meanings should begin in the family and not be banished from it. In the interests of 
justice we must ensure that emphasis on private decision-making does not return 
family living to its zone of privacy in which non-intervention by law approved a 
problematic status quo. Feminist critiques of this public/private divide brought family 
living into the public gaze decades ago; those lives and disputes about them must 
not, as a matter of policy, be buried again.5 Thus, family law must strike a balance 
between the privacy of its concerns and their public nature.  
 
Yet, in ‘private’ family law matters, fiscal austerity has linked with policy and legal 
preoccupation with and approbation of ‘autonomy’ to skew the balance. Husbands, 
wives, partners, mothers and fathers are encouraged to do family, in particular to 
resolve their legal disputes, privately, outside of the publicity and transparency of the 
courts and the principled justice the courts provide. This diversion toward private 
dispute resolution has the advantage, it is said, of both saving money (the state’s if 
not the individual’s), but also and primarily, of respecting the parties’ autonomy and 
encouraging them to take responsibility not only for making their own decisions but 
also for the consequences of those decisions. In this paper I’d like to explore this 
new prioritisation of autonomy in family law. It has particular resonance in the context 
of family dispute resolution, but I think, also extends beyond that context. Autonomy 
has become more than one aspect of justice in the new, ‘modernised’ family justice 
system, it is becoming almost its very essence.  
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Autonomy-as-justice is expressed in two ways in the family justice system, even 
while they are linked. The first expression is structural and procedural. It relates to 
the creation of an autonomous system of dispute resolution that is separate from and 
runs parallel with the formal justice system. The second expression is conceptual 
and relates to assumptions about a particular kind of individual autonomy that must 
be activated by and allowed to flourish in the family justice system.   
 
I Autonomy of Process: The Decreasing Shadow of the Law  
 
In ADR, the autonomous system which seeks not the substantive justice of the law, 
but what Lord Neuberger called, quoting Thomas Main6, ‘individualized justice’7, we 
see the first expression of justice-as-autonomy. The then Master of Rolls described 
ADR in civil justice as  
 
… a relatively new form of justice, which, when compared with traditional 
litigation … involves far greater procedural flexibility and a far greater range 
of remedies than formal adjudication. As a result, it is, in many cases, better 
able to achieve a just or fair outcome for the parties, provided that they both 
have the will to settle their differences. Fair here not because the outcome 
necessarily reflects the substantive legal merits of the underlying dispute but 
rather because the parties have both participated in a consensual process 
and reached a mutually agreeable resolution. It is a justice not based on a 
commitment to substantive justice’s achievement.8  
 
Autonomous dispute resolution of this type is an important part of any justice system. 
It offers the opportunity for individualised justice which can provide a resolution 
tailored to meet the needs of the parties and also a potential public ‘good’. It can, for 
example, serve public values like education in self-determination and respect for 
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others.9 The problem for many, however, is when the system distorts the balance 
between individualised justice and substantive justice and individualised justice 
becomes in effect, the ‘essence’ of the system. Although it is particularly prominent 
in family justice, we see this trend across the civil justice system as a whole. Hazel 
Genn, in her Hamlyn observations on access to civil justice wrote ‘. . . it is hard not to 
draw the conclusion that the main thrust of modern civil justice reform is about 
neither access nor justice. It is simply about diversion of disputants away from the 
courts. It is essentially about less law and the downgrading of civil justice.’10
      
Lord Neuberger made this point also. He criticised the Ministry of Justice view that 
‘The civil and family courts are principally concerned with resolving private disputes 
between individuals or companies. These are not criminal cases’, and its implicit 
point that the civil and family justice systems simply provide private benefits for 
individuals and no, or at least a very limited, public good.11 In truth, he said, the civil 
and family justice systems, just like the criminal justice system, provide ‘collective 
benefits for the society as a whole . . .’ through securing the rule of law. He said 
there is a danger which could arise if ADR became seen as the very essence of the 
civil justice system that ‘stems from a failure to understand the fundamentally 
different roles which formal adjudication and ADR have.’12 Here he writes again of 
the civil justice system, but his words are equally, if not more, applicable to the family 
justice system.  
 
If the civil justice system simply provided a private benefit to individuals – 
the view which sees justice as no more than a part of the service sector of 
the economy rather than a branch of government – such an idea could, at 
least in theory, be right. If resolving disputes simply involved conferring 
private benefits ADR could properly lie at the heart of the civil justice 
system … The civil justice system is not however part of the service sector 
and confers more than simply private benefits. … A civil justice system 
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which had ADR at its heart, which placed too great a weight on it, whatever 
it might be, it would not be a civil justice system.13 
 
This, in my view, is precisely the fundamental error made in the modernised family 
justice system. ADR, in the pursuit of what Noel Semple 14  calls family law’s 
‘settlement mission’ has become the essence of the family justice system. It has 
resulted in the creation of a new, separate but increasingly primary system designed 
to provide individualised justice, at least partly because policy makers believe that 
resolving disputes about family matters confers only a private benefit for the 
individuals concerned.   
 
Disputes between parents about their children are private and the 
consequences of individual choice in this conception of the relationship 
between state and family, and they are not significant enough to warrant the 
full panoply of the family justice system.15 
 
 
We see here the Ministry of Justice view that engages both aspects of autonomy-as-
justice. It constructs family law matters as private and the result of individual choice 
(the exercise of autonomy) and therefore as not sufficiently significant to engage the 
courts or the ‘full panoply’ of the justice system. They do, however, engage the 
autonomous family justice system in which justice is done by promoting further 
private, individual, autonomous choices. Positioning the state/family relationship in 
this way encourages and reveres autonomous decision-making then trivialises its 
consequences. It isolates ‘private’ family decisions from their public meaning, public 
consequences and from public concern. It renders irrelevant to them a meaning of 
justice based on principles other than autonomy.  
 
The ground for this view of autonomous dispute resolution as family justice arguably 
is laid in the rhetoric in which legal disputes between family members have become 
                                                          
13 Ibid. Para. 42 
14 N Semple, ‘Mandatory Family Mediation and the Settlement Mission : A Feminist Critique’ (2012) 
CJWL/RFD  
15 Ministry of Justice, ‘Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales’, (Consultation 
Paper CP12/10), 2010, para. 4.19 
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less ‘legal disputes’ and more ‘relationship problems’.16 This reconstruction of family 
law disputes first the sets the stage for and then vindicates law’s supposed 
unsuitability in dealing with them. What were once claims for legal entitlements 
become non-justiciable, and become either  moral claims residing, as Lady Hale said, 
in honour only17, or emotional claims thought best to be resolved by therapy or 
counselling to ‘heal’ the parties or their relationship.18 Even in courts, ‘the de facto 
priority’ is not to make and enforce legal decisions but, rather, “to resolve conflicts 
and encourage parents to put the past behind”’.19 And because this discourse also 
keeps family disputes firmly in the realm of the personal and private and therefore 
relevant only to the parties, resolving them has less to do with law and principles of 
justice, and more to do with individual behaviour modification or therapeutic 
techniques of problem solving.20 Again, it may be true that for many families problem 
solving rather than law is appropriate,21 but for many it is not. And of course, while 
exploring all avenues of dispute resolution is part of a court’s role, it is problematic 
when all of those avenues lead away from formal law. In any event, there is a 
broader concern if individualised, therapeutic problem solving is said, as it is, to be a 
part of the justice system, but is not scrutinised, regulated or governed by the rules 
or objectives of that system including the rule of law, equality, substantive fairness 
and due process. Instead, emotional and relational health seems to be the goal of a 
settlement in which the parties become educated, healthy and able to express 
(appropriately) their individual autonomy and thereby be freed from the formal 
system. This virtual de-legalisation of family disputes not only reinforces the 
previously discredited boundary between public and private, it expresses what 
Semple calls ‘the informal and almost clandestine nature of the settlement mission’22 
in family law that is pursued on an ad hoc basis by almost all participants in the 
system,  and is supported by the ideology of autonomy.  
 
                                                          
16 F Kaganas, ‘Regulating Emotion: Judging Contact Disputes’ (2011) CFLQ 63.  
17 Lady Brenda Hale, ‘Equal Access to Justice in the Big Society’, Sir Henry Hodge Memorial Lecture 2011 
18 Kaganas 2011 (n 16).   
19 Semple, 2012 (n 14). 
20 Kaganas 2011 (n 16). 
21 Kaganas, ibid; J Eekelaar, ‘Can There Be Family Justice Without Law?’ In: M Maclean, J Eeekelar 
and B Bastard, Delivering Family Justice in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 1st edn, 2015) ch 19 
22 Semple (n 14) p 236 
7 
 
In contrast, understanding family disputes as matters to which substantive justice 
and the rule of law apply understands them as matters of both public and private 
concern. And so, while we may have disagreed with a court’s interpretation of, for 
example, fairness or welfare in family justice, we knew what it was and we knew how 
the court got to that interpretation. We could challenge, criticise or support the 
process and the outcome. In contrast, the justice system’s pursuit of the settlement 
mission, preferring conflict resolution to ‘law’ almost by default at all stages, may now 
shield it from much of this type of scrutiny.23  
 
Commercial Service Providers - Mediation 
Main24 observed that ADR has a similar place within the legal system now that equity 
once had.  
 
ADR offers an alternative system for relief from the hardship created by the 
substantive and procedural law of formal adjudication. Moreover, the 
freedom, elasticity, and luminance of ADR bear a striking resemblance to 
traditional Equity, offering relaxed rules of evidence and procedure, tailored 
remedies, a simpler and less legalistic structure, improved access to justice, 
and a casual relationship with the substantive law. Alas, the dark side of 
ADR is also reminiscent of Equity: unaccountability, secrecy, an inability to 
extend its jurisdictional reach beyond the parties immediately before it, and 
a certain vulnerability to capture by special interests.25  
 
His words resonate on more than one level. The new autonomous family justice 
system encourages the use of private sector service providers whose practice 
exhibits the characteristics Main attributes above to traditional Equity. Yet, mediators 
and IFLA Arbitrators are businesses in a burgeoning new market in justice. They 
exemplify Lord Neuberger’s description of the view ‘which sees justice as no more 
than a part of the service sector of the economy rather than a branch of 
government.’26 Indeed, these service providers see themselves as accountable to 
their clients or to the ‘market’ rather than to the courts. Unlike the lawyers who 
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become involved in negotiating the private resolution of family disputes, mediators 
and arbitrators are not officers of the court.27 Indeed, Lisa Parkinson approves of 
mediators’ independence of the courts - their autonomy - and observes that 
mediators  
 
are accountable through their professional body to the Family Mediation Council 
and in publicly funded cases to the Legal Aid Agency, ultimately also to the 
government and the taxpayer. Complaints procedures, client feedback via 
questionnaires and follow-up consumer studies by independent researchers are 
all essential to monitor and evaluate the quality of service that mediators provide.28 
 
Because mediators, she says, ‘offer a form of participatory justice that differs from 
formally imposed justice’,29 they therefore must remain independent of the judicial 
system.30  
 
From its earliest days, feminist critics have warned of mediation’s need to be 
attentive to the norms it purveys, to protecting women vulnerable to domestic 
violence and to ensuring a fair balance of power between parties and I will not 
rehearse them here.31 Many of these concerns have been acknowledged. Screening 
for domestic violence is now standard practice and mediators are attuned to power 
imbalances between the parties. Many mediators have developed innovative ideas 
of ‘best practice’ that acknowledge mediator accountability for norms in both process 
and outcome and for ‘empowering’ parties equally.32 While some suggest that these 
shifts in mediation practice and philosophy are still ‘works in progress’, 33  their 
recognition means that mediation’s goal of helping the parties to construct their own 
                                                          
27 J Doughty and M Murch, ‘Judicial Independence and the Restructuring of Family Courts and Their 
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29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. p214 
31 See eg, R H Mnookin, ‘Divorce bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering’ (1985) 18 U of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 1015; P E Bryan’Killing Us Softly: Divorce mediation and the Politics of Power’ 
(1992) 40 Buffalo Law Review 441; M Shaffer’Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective (1988) 46 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 162; ABottomley, ‘What is happening to Family Law? A 
Feminist Critique of Conciliation’ (1989) 8 Can J of Family Law 61;  T Grillo ‘The Mediation Alternative: 
process Dangers for Women’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1545.  
32 See eg Bush and Folger (n 9); C Irvine ’Mediation and Social Norms: A Response to Dame Hazel 
Genn’ [2009] Fam Law vol 39. 
33 Semple (n 14), see also R Hunter, A Barlow , J Smithson and J Ewing  ‘Mapping Paths to Family 
Justice : matching parties, cases and processes’ [2014] Fam Law, Vol. 10  
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individualised private justice34 – justice-as-autonomy - makes sense. That goal may 
also make sense to many parties to whom both the process and the outcome feel 
‘just’. But for many neither the process nor outcome is just. For them, justice-as-
autonomy may permit processes that fail to balance power appropriately35 and/or 
outcomes based upon ‘retrograde norms that the formal justice system would not 
countenance.’36 And again, it is not offering mediation as one dispute resolution 
option that is the problem, it is the justice system’s active and unreserved promotion 
of justice-as-autonomy in mediation that is my concern.  
 
There is another concern about mediation becoming the essence of family justice. 
Critics suggest that despite new reflective practice among some mediators, some 
may continue to fail to examine the normative basis from which they pursue their 
goal of party empowerment as independent, individualised, participatory justice. 
Bastard37 suggests, for example, that mediation process may be actually linked to 
particular outcomes. He notes that the mediation project reflects the current 
preference for a specific model of couple and family relationships; one that is ruled 
by negotiation, cooperation and reflection. In this sense, mediation and co-parenting 
go together and their success is interlinked. The norm of the substantive outcome is 
reflected in the process and vice versa. Without awareness of this link, mediation’s 
claim to facilitate party empowerment and individualised justice may be 
compromised. 
 
Similarly, Charlie Irvine38 challenges the claim that mediators practise a form of pure 
party empowerment by way of mediator neutrality in which the mediators stay silent 
and norms come from the parties themselves. He suggests this form of mediation, 
which he terms the ‘norm-generating’ model of mediation, is ‘mere rhetoric’ and in 
reality may be the least frequently practised model of mediation. He identifies two 
                                                          
34 see Parkinson (n 34)  p 212 
35 See Bush and Folger (n 9) pp 29 – 32, Semple (n 14), Hunter et.al. (n 33); J Eekelaar and M Maclean 
Family Justice The Work of Family Judges  in Uncertain Times (2013); A Barlow, R Hunter, J Smithson and J 
Ewing, Mapping Paths to Family Justice Briefing Paper and Key Findings (2014) University of Exeter, University 
of Kent and ESRC. 
36 A Macklin, ‘Multiculturalism Meets Privatisation: The Case of Faith-Based Arbitration’ (2013) 
International Journal of Law in Context, 9, 343  
37 B Bastard, ‘Family mediation in France: A new profession has been established, but where are the 
clients?’ Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, Vol. 32 Issue 2, pp 135-142 
38 C Irvine, ‘Mediation and Social Norms : A Response to Dame Hazel Genn’, [2009] Fam. Law Vol. 
39, p 351 
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other models, norm educating and norm advocating, and says these may be 
practised more frequently. The consequence says Irvine, is that mediators can and 
do encourage particular results, while at the same time taking no responsibility for 
them. He concludes by urging mediators to examine their own values and engage in 
reflective practice.39 Otherwise, what we have is a large number of disputes being 
regulated according to unstated, sometimes unconscious values and norms that are 
invisible to the parties in both process and outcome, yet for which they are 
nevertheless to take responsibility.  
 
Even where mediators do not mediate they have a clear gatekeeping role in the 
family justice system in the now mandatory Mediation Information and Assessment 
Meetings or MIAMs,40  although Parkinson prefers the term ‘gate opening’.41 The 
overall role of the MIAM is murky, however, especially in the context of a decline in 
the uptake of mediation services since the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO).42  Jane Robey sees the MIAM as ‘a key plank in the 
government’s drive to encourage couples to use family mediation’, and as intended 
‘ideally [to] represent[s] the first stage of an ongoing mediation process that lasts 
several weeks.’43  The Ministry of Justice agrees and commissioned research to 
determine what MIAMs need to achieve if they are to ‘maximise conversion to 
effective mediation.’44 Barlow et al, however,45 would prefer to see the MIAM as what 
they would re-term a Dispute Resolution Information and Assessment Meeting or 
DRIAM, a type of triage in which all potential means of resolving family legal disputes 
are explored in an effort to identify the most appropriate for the parties. The 
alternatives would include as equally legitimate means of resolving family disputes 
                                                          
39 He is not alone in this. See also H Astor ‘Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and 
Practice’ (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 221-239 and Bush and Folger n9. 
40 Doughty and Murch (n 27). The Children and Families Act 2014 made attendance at a MIAM 
mandatory for all separated couples who wish to make a court application to resolve all children and 
or financial issues, unless one of the exemptions applies. The primary exemptions relate to domestic 
violence and bankruptcy. See also Practice Direction 3A, November 2015.  
41 Parkinson n 34 
42 A Bloch, R McLeod, B Toombs, ‘Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings (MIAMs) and 
mediation in private family law disputes : Qualitative research findings’, Ministry of Justice Analytical 
Series (2014)  
43 J Robey (2015), ‘Mediation Matters : Hopes and fears for the next five years’, found at  : 
http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/mediation-matters-hopes-and-fears-for-the-next-five-
years#.VkufmN_hC3U 
44 Bloch et al 2014 (n 42) p 3. 
45 Barlow et al (n 35); see also A Diduck, ‘Justice by ADR in private family matters: is it fair and is it 
possible?’ [2014] Fam Law 616 
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court adjudication and other forms of court intervention such as First Hearing Dispute 
Resolution Appointments (FHDRAs), along with mediation, solicitor negotiation, 
collaborative law and private arbitration. As it is now, however, MIAMs required by 
the Children and Families Act 2014 and the Family Proceedings Rules, and 
conducted by mediators, are intended to maximise the uptake of mediation and 
mediators are ‘increasing their marketing activity to bolster their business.’46   In 
MIAMs we see the symbiosis of government policy, the rules of court and the 
business of the market to maintain the privacy and autonomy of family disputes and 
their resolution.   
 
Commercial Service Providers – Arbitration 
The autonomous family justice system also includes private arbitration. Private 
arbitration of family law disputes promotes primarily the autonomy of process, 
although the courts and some practitioners have suggested that like mediation it also 
promotes the parties’ autonomy by supporting them to make their own decisions 
about how to resolve their disputes and ‘more importantly, be bound by them.’47  
Members of the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators, formed in 2012, are subject to the 
regulatory and disciplinary codes of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, which on 
its website defines itself as ‘a leading professional membership organisation 
representing the interests of alternative dispute practitioners worldwide’. According to 
its Royal Charter, the primary object of CIArb is ‘to promote and facilitate worldwide 
the determination of disputes by arbitration and alternative means of private dispute 
resolution other than resolution by the court (collectively called "private dispute 
resolution").’48 
 
Members of the Institute must apply the law of England and Wales, but the process 
they use and the decisions they reach are confidential. Indeed confidentiality is one 
of arbitration’s selling points and is mandated in the IFLA Rules. As The President 
said in W v M (TOLATA Proceedings: Anonymity)49 ‘Where parties are agreed that 
                                                          
46 Bloch et. al (n 42) p14.  
47 S Kingston and J Thomas, ‘What’s the alternative : arbitration facts’, July [2015] Fam Law 814 p816 
48 May be found at : http://www.ciarb.org/guidelines-and-ethics/royal-charter-bye-laws-and-regulations 
49 [2012] EWHC 1679 
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their case should be afforded total privacy there is a very simple solution: they sign 
an arbitration agreement’.50  
 
Not all arbitrations are conducted by members of the IFLA, however. Outside of the 
IFLA, parties in arbitration can agree on any law they want to be applied to their 
situation including the law of another jurisdiction or religious law. Unless the parties 
or one of them later seek a court order confirming the terms of the arbitral award, the 
courts will not examine it. And even where courts are asked to confirm the arbitral 
award, one might be forgiven for thinking that they will scrutinise it before confirming 
the arbitral award as a consent order. In S v S51, however, the President of the 
Family Division confirmed that notwithstanding the actual outcome of the award, the 
fact that the parties agreed to subject their dispute to arbitration meant that the 
award should determine the order a court subsequently makes, whether by way of 
consent or even if one party challenges it. In support of his conclusion, the President 
quoted Sir Peter Singer, former Justice of the High Court Family Division, and a 
founding member of the IFLA. ‘Where the parties have bound themselves to accept 
an arbitral award of the kind provided by the IFLA scheme, this generates a single 
magnetic factor of determinative importance.’52 Importantly, the President saw choice 
and party autonomy as the foundation for his view: ’This after all, reflects the 
approach spelt out by the Supreme Court in Radmacher.  … In the absence of some 
very compelling countervailing factor(s), the arbitral award should be determinative 
of the order the court makes.’ 53  Regardless of one’s view of Radmacher’s 54 
approach to autonomy, lest one think that parties negotiating to arrive at mutually 
agreed terms manifests their autonomy in a way that their agreeing to be bound by 
whatever decision an arbitrator makes does not, the President went on: ‘There is no 
conceptual difference between the making of an agreement and agreeing to give an 
arbitrator the power to make the decision for them.’55   
                                                          
50 Ibid. Para. 70  
51 [2014] EWHC 7  
52 Ibid. Para. 19  
53 Ibid.  
54 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, which in the context of giving effect to prenuptial agreements, 
highlights the importance of respecting the parties’ autonomy.    
55 Ibid. The President has since then released Practice Guidance on the procedure to be 
followed where arbitral awards are to be reflected in a court order. (23 November 2015) The 
Guidance applies to arbitrations conducted under the Arbitration Act 1996 and which are 
decided only in accordance with the laws of England and Wales. It reiterates the President’s 
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This is a striking interpretation of the Radmacher decision. It extends the autonomy 
principle from allowing the parties themselves to decide their matters, to allowing 
them to give up any role in the decision. Here, we have the President of the Family 
Division endorsing, on the grounds of party autonomy, a private, for profit, dispute 
resolution system that runs separate but parallel to the court system. The fact that it 
is privately funded and therefore available only to some, and is staffed by what could 
be seen as a self-regulated bench, accountable only to its own professional 
organisation and the parties who hire it, and whose decisions are confidential and 
reviewable by courts only on the narrowest of grounds,56 appears unimportant.  
Where the court in S v S was not interested in scrutinising the justice of the outcome 
of the arbitral award, in AI v MT57 the court seemed little concerned with the justice of 
the process adopted by the arbitrator. In AI v MT the parties wished all of their 
divorce related matters, finances and care of their children, to be referred to faith 
based arbitration. Baker J reserved his jurisdiction to scrutinise the arbitral outcome, 
based upon his duty to promote the welfare of the children.  
In the result, the court approved the New York Beth Din’s outcome concerning both 
financial and residence and contact matters. First, it found the financial award 
between the spouses to be ‘unobjectionable’58  and on that basis confirmed it. Here 
we have some minimal judicial scrutiny of outcome, although ‘unobjectionable’ is a 
far cry from ‘fair’, the objective in English law. In any event, the court was not 
concerned that it had little information about the process adopted by the Beth Din 
including the evidence it considered. It knew only that  ‘the parties agreed and 
accepted that the financial agreements set out in the schedule may be contrary to 
legal advice from their English solicitors, their respective barristers having not been 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
view from S v S: ‘where the parties are putting the matter before the court by consent, … it can only 
be in the rarest of cases that it will be appropriate for the judge to do other than approve the order.’  
(para 12). Where the order is opposed S v S is also referred to: 'The court will no doubt adopt an 
appropriately robust approach, both to the procedure it adopts in dealing with such a challenge and 
to the test it applies in deciding the outcome. … The parties will almost invariably forfeit the right to 
anything other than a most abbreviated hearing; only in highly exceptional circumstances is the 
court likely to permit anything more than a very abbreviated hearing.’ (para 17). 
  
56 L Ferguson, ‘Arbitration in financial dispute resolution: the final step to reconstructing the default (s) 
and exception (s)’ (2013) 35: 1 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 115-138 
57 [2013] EWHC 100 
58 Ibid. para. 37 
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instructed to provide any advice on the financial matters’59 . The court was not 
troubled by the award’s implicit departure from principles of fairness developed in 
English law or to examine the evidence upon which that departure was made. 
Second, while the court was satisfied that the welfare of the children was preserved 
by the Beth Din’s outcome, it had no information about the process for achieving it, 
such as whether principles important to English law such as the wishes and feelings 
or rights of the children were considered.60   
 
Baker J stated that there was no precedent for family arbitration in 2010 when he 
made his order referring this matter to the New York Beth Din, but that since then, 
‘the Rubicon has been crossed and an arbitration scheme in matrimonial finance 
cases [referring to the IFLA] is now established’.61 The IFLA does not yet arbitrate 
children’s matters, although a working group is currently reviewing this situation 
looking to extend the IFLA scheme to cover children arrangements.62 But, in July 
2014, the first steps toward private arbitration of children issues may have been 
taken. Alex Verdan et al63 comment upon what they understood to be the first use of 
Early Neutral Evaluation in a private law children dispute. At the First Hearing 
Dispute Resolution Appointment the parties were unable to resolve the issues and 
agreed to instruct an ENE to ‘assist the parties in reaching an agreement or 
determine the case’ and to be bound by the determination of the evaluator.64 Like 
arbitration, the ENE process is flexible and in the control of the parties. In this case 
the procedure was to ‘broadly mirror’ the procedure in FPR 2010, including the 
evaluator ‘hearing evidence or argument (as may be agreed) as in a contested court 
hearing.’65 There is no mechanism in place to appeal the decision of the evaluator 
and in these circumstances the authors expect that ‘the court will uphold the decision 
where it follows an impartial adjudication following a recognised process where the 
                                                          
59 Ibid. para. 25  
60 T Tolley, ‘When binding is not binding and when not binding, binds': An analysis of the procedural 
route of ‘non-binding arbitration', (2013) CFLQ Vol. 25, No. 4 484 
61 (n 57) Para. 31  
62 Kingston and Thomas (n 47) 
63 A Verdan H Nosworthy, D Eaton and K Kelsey ‘Early Neutral Evaluation in Private Law Children’s 
Disputes : The Way Forward?’ at http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/early-neutral-
evaluations-in-private-law-children-disputes-the-way-forward#.Vkz87t_hC3U 
64 Ibid. p 1 
65 Ibid. p 2 
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objective is to achieve a fair result’ 66  and conclude that ‘there is considerable 
potential for the use of ENEs within private law children disputes.’ 67  
 
This celebration of the burgeoning market in private family adjudication may not be 
surprising, but is, in my view, curious if not alarming. The advantages it is said to 
offer are speed (although AI v MT took 18 months) cost saving (for the state; the 
parties must pay for the venues, the decision-makers and the legal advice they are 
encouraged to have throughout), flexibility of procedure (which can be seen 
alternatively as lack of procedural safeguards) and confidentiality (or lack of public 
scrutiny of the norms and principles on which decisions are reached). At the same 
time it does little to counteract what are said to be the disadvantages of court-based 
adjudication: adversarialism and imposition of a decision not of the parties’ own 
making. If arbitration in any way promotes party autonomy it is the autonomy of 
those who can afford financially to opt out of the formal court system in which 
principles of justice are applied and are open to public scrutiny. 
 
As Lord Neuberger reminded us, we must be clear about whether mediators and 
arbitrators are providing a service or are providing justice and what the difference 
may be between the two. And as Main observed, we must be wary also of ADR’s 
‘vulnerability to capture by special interests’.68 And overall, there are as Doughty and 
Murch69 highlighted, not only constitutional issues about the judicial role, judicial 
independence and the separation of powers, but there are issues also about the 
apparent faith in the market to provide justice and the corresponding lack of faith in 
the state to deliver it.  
 
Legal Advice or Legal Information? 
Lawyers have a peculiar place in the family justice system. On the one hand they 
violate both understandings of autonomy. First of all they represent the law which as 
we have seen is anathema to family problems, and second they offer advice which 
clients are meant to follow, rather than information upon which individuals can base 
their personal choices. When autonomy is justice it makes sense that law and 
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lawyers are demonised formally. Barlow et al70 note, for example the Ministry of 
Justice materials that ‘rely on anti-lawyer and anti-court stereotypes, e.g. referring to 
‘big legal fees’ and ‘long drawn-out court battles’ in their promotion of mediation.71  At 
the same time, however, and on the other hand, lawyers are regarded neutrally for 
those who have exercised their autonomy appropriately by opting out of the formal 
system and engaging the parallel one.  
 
Many arbitrators and some mediators recommend that parties engage lawyers as 
they proceed through the autonomous justice system. This private expense is 
regarded as an appropriate exercise of party autonomy. In contrast, as we have 
seen, lawyers are discouraged throughout the formal justice system, even while 
some parties, who are able to afford to hire a lawyer, resist that message and retain 
one anyway. The formal message is curious as the empirical evidence is clear that 
legal advice has a great part to play in encouraging settlement in the formal system72  
whether in partisan or collaborative negotiations or FHDRAs. As the Action 
Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Law Matters in Canada observed, 
legal advice is crucial in the whole spectrum of dispute resolution and its availability 
on legal aid ought to be increased.73 Yet, for the autonomous individual who insists 
upon engaging the formal system, lawyers are seen as part of the problem and not 
the solution.  
 
Instead of legal advice, autonomous family members are encouraged to access on 
line ‘hubs’ which provide information about separation and divorce, cohabitation and 
child support, for example, rather than advice about claiming legal entitlements. And 
based upon this information, individuals are meant to choose ‘not-law’ over law.74 
Private decision-making is presented as the rational and responsible choice and 
recourse to law only as the last resort when private ordering fails.75  
                                                          
70 Barlow et. al (n 35); see also Eekelaar (n 21) 
71 Barlow et. al (n 35) p32 
72 See eg, M Maclean and J Eekelaar, Family Law Advocacy: How Barristers Help the Victims of 
Family Failure (Oxford: Hart Publications, 2009) and J Eekelaar, M Maclean and S Beinart, Family 
Lawyers: The Divorce Work of Solicitors (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
73 Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, Access to Civil and Family 
Justice A Roadmap for Change (2013) p 14. 
74 Eekelaar (n 21) pp 344-345  
75 A Diduck ‘Autonomy and Vulnerability in Family Law: the missing link’ in J Herring and J Wallbank, 
Vulnerabilities, care and family law (Routledge, 2014) p.104 
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Whether or not information hubs are effective in directing people’s choices away 
from law is questionable, however. Helen Reece 76  examined ‘Advicenow’, a 
government information hub that offered legal information for cohabitants on the 
assumptions not only that the information it provided would influence people’s 
behaviour, but also that that behaviour should be changed.  She noted that while the 
‘hub’ may have achieved some limited success in informing people, it made little 
headway in influencing their behaviour. Expectations of the responsible, autonomous 
cohabitant to act upon information and exercise his or her autonomy by making the 
‘right’ choices seemed to commit Barlow and Duncan’s ‘rationality mistake’;77 people 
did not always act according to the logic of economics or law, they often acted in 
accordance with imperatives of their own lives. Yet this failure of information to 
influence behaviour may not be the point. Reece questions the assumption that it 
should and suggests that often, ‘cohabitants’ recalcitrance may be something to 
celebrate.’78 Similarly, in the context of another online information ‘hub’ Eekelaar 
wonders:  
 
when the UK website, Child Maintenance Options, proclaims: ‘There are no laws 
that say how parents should arrange child maintenance’ and that the ‘most 
important thing about family-based arrangements … is that you and the other 
parent can decide between yourselves what, when and how you will both 
support your child’ is this suggesting that the parents are completely free to 
bargain over whether one of them needs to perform that obligation?79 
 
Finally, not only do they presume a particular problematic type of individual 
autonomy, and a particular expression of justice in exercising it, these information 
hubs serve another purpose. They, combined with the LASPO and MIAMs, are part 
of the dominant message that family disputes are not really legal disputes. They are 
part of the system’s strategy to promote the privatisation, individualisation and 
                                                          
76 H Reece, ‘Leaping without Looking’ in : R Leckey After Equality: Family Sex, Kinship (Social Justice) 
(Routledge, 2014)  
77 A Barlow and S Duncan ‘New Labour’s Communitarianism, supporting families and the “rationality mistake: 
Part 1” Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, Volume 22, Number 1, 1 February 2000 , pp. 
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78 Reece, ibid. 
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delegalisation of family disputes, and in effect encourage the majority away not only 
from the courts, but from law. This diversion is worrying in the context of recent legal 
statements that created new legal principles of gender and generational justice in 
family law. In promoting justice-as-autonomy in an otherwise law-free environment, 
usually in money, property and child-related matters, these principles can be 
disregarded and it will be primarily women and children who are disadvantaged.80 As 
Lady Hale wrote, encouraging autonomy in making prenuptial agreements that fall 
outside the guiding principles established by law, including those concluded without 
legal advice, ‘may serve to benefit only the strong at the expense of the weak’.81 
Similarly, writing about the US system’s drive toward mediation, Robert Bush and 
Joseph Folger82 observe that critics have long seen the privatisation of legal disputes 
‘as a kind of cynical ploy, designed to shift into a disaggregating forum the very kinds 
of cases likely to benefit from judicial resolution, given the progressive trends in legal 
doctrine that had [recently] emerged’ … and that ‘ADR mechanisms were 
tantamount to a “con game” where parties were “nickeled and dimed” into deals that 
gave away hard won rights for themselves and others.’83.   
 
In sum, we see developing an autonomous dispute resolution system for families 
that is increasingly separated from the courts and from the law which those courts 
protect and represent. While procedures that support private decision making must 
be a part of any healthy justice system, it is their centralisation as the ‘heart’ of the 
family justice system that worries me. And this delegalisation of family disputes is 
curious in the light of the LASPO’s clear acceptance that law and lawyers provide 
safeguards to parties both in terms of outcome and procedure; lawyers help to 
ensure a fair balance of power and protection in achieving legal entitlements. It is 
precisely for this reason that the LASPO permits the ‘vulnerable’ family disputant 
state-funded access to lawyers and to courts. Here we see the link emerging 
between the two aspects of autonomy I introduced above. Autonomous dispute 
resolution is promoted for the autonomous subject because justice for that subject 
means simply protecting and reinforcing his or her autonomy. The vulnerable and 
therefore not-autonomous subject on the other hand, needs the safeguards of formal, 
                                                          
80 Diduck n 75; see also Eekelaar Ibid. p 348  
81 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 para 135. 
82 Bush and Folger (n 9)  
83 Ibid. p 6  
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substantive law and is therefore permitted access to non-private justice.  Apart from 
the problematic definition of vulnerable and its other, autonomy, which I will examine 
in the next section, we must wonder why the vulnerable (and arguably the rich) are 
deemed the only deserving recipients of this social good.   
 
Part 2: Autonomy of the Individual 
As Jonathan Herring wrote in 2010, ‘autonomy has achieved a “sacred status” not 
only among lawyers, but within wider society’.84 In family justice this means as we 
have seen, that ‘the state’s role is limited to assisting parties to reach an 
agreement’ 85   and aims simply to educate the parties to make their own best 
decisions: ‘individuals should have the right information and support to enable them 
to take responsibility for the consequences of their relationship breakdown’.86  While 
it is entirely appropriate that the justice system supports parties who wish to and are 
able to reach agreements whether by mediation or otherwise, the autonomy it 
assumes and encourages for those parties to make decisions about their 
relationships is a particular kind of autonomy that may not reflect the circumstances 
of their lives.  
 
Here is the second expression of autonomy-as-justice in family law. But, the 
individual autonomy assumed and encouraged in the family justice system is 
problematic. First, it is abstract or ‘theoretical’. As McLachlin, J (as she then was) 
recognised in the Supreme Court of Canada decision Miron v Trudel, one’s freedom 
to choose one’s family relations – in this case to marry or to cohabit without marriage 
– exists in theory only, in practice reality is sometimes otherwise.87  The autonomy 
presumed by the family justice system is the abstract autonomy of liberalism.  
[It is] premised on the myth of a pre-existing equal playing field on which 
each individual has equal freedom, power and capacity to express it. … This 
                                                          
84 J Herring, ‘Relational Autonomy and Family Law’ in J Wallbank, S Choudhry and J Herring, Rights, 
Gender and Family Law (Routledge, 1st edn, 2010) ch 12, p257.  
85 Ibid. p 259  
86  House of Commons Library Note: Financial Provision Orders on the Breakdown of a Relationship 
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autonomy is not necessarily impervious to dependency or structural and 
social conditions but when these are not rendered irrelevant in its mythical 
ideal expression they are taken to revoke, or at least to damage, the 
subject’s autonomy. 88   
As others89 have explored elsewhere, many policy and legal reforms in the last two 
decades have displayed a pre-occupation with a form of neo-liberalism promoting  
‘privatisation’ and individual responsibility, whose ‘other’, or opposite, seemed to be  
dependency. Families and family members were to take responsibility for themselves; 
dependence on the state was deplored and stigmatised. Since then, this 
remoralising of responsible behaviour 90  has continued; incapacity benefit and 
housing benefit for those under the age of 25 are characterised by the Prime Minister 
as ‘something for nothing,’ 91  and most forms of dependence continue to be 
stigmatised.92  
Sommerlad observes in this rhetoric an evoking of ‘two ideal types – the responsible 
citizen and the welfare parasite’93  that informs the reconfiguring of the social order. 
In the new social order social responsibility means freedom from the state and the 
concurrent presumption that dependence on the state is to be penalised. But we can 
also discern a shift in that policy rhetoric. While the social ideal remains individual 
responsibility, that responsibility is now to be achieved by exercising individual 
autonomy. Given that autonomy is framed in a discourse of freedom94, equality, 
dignity, choice and respect,95 and now justice, it is difficult to argue against it. The 
discourse of autonomy thus adds value to the old individual responsibility rhetoric; it 
is easier to defend politically and philosophically. And concurrently in the new 
                                                          
88 Diduck (n 75) p 101..   
89 See eg Diduck (n 75); Fiona Williams, Rethinking Families (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation 2004; 
H Sommerlad ‘Access to Justice in Hard Times and the Deconstruction of Democratic Citizenship’ in 
M Maclean, J Eekelaar and B Bastard Delivering Family Justice in the 21st Century (Routledge 2015)  
90 See for example, Shelley Day Sclater and Christine Piper, `Re-moralising the family? Family policy, 
family law and youth justice’ (2000) 12 CFLQ 135; Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: a Theory of 
Dependency (New Press 2004); Williams (2004) ibid. 
91 The Rt Hon David Cameron MP, ‘Welfare Speech’  (Cabinet Office and Prime Minister's Office, 
Bluewater, Kent, 25 June 2012) <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/welfare-speech/> accessed 24 
May 2013 
92 N Fraser and L Gordon, ‘A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare 
State' (1994) 19(2) Signs 309 
93 H. Sommerlad n 89. 
94 As in the US, see Fineman (n 89).  
95 As in Canada, see Quebec (Attorney General) v A [2013] SCC 5. 
21 
 
discourse, some dependence, by some people, may now be tolerated. If one is 
classed as ‘vulnerable’, one’s dependence or lack of autonomy is excused and the 
role of the law and the state has become to remedy that condition to help the 
individual to achieve autonomy.96 
And so, in the same way that individual responsibility may now be recast as 
autonomy, dependence may now be recast as vulnerability.97 Vulnerability connotes 
a state for which the individual is not so obviously to blame. ‘”[T]he vulnerable” tend 
to be constructed … as those who are less accountable for their circumstances or 
actions’.98  By deploying the language of vulnerability rather than irresponsibility or 
dependence, government can humanise cuts to previously universal benefits; 
benefits are targeted now at the vulnerable who are constructed as ‘those who have 
less “agency” in the development of perceived difficulties in their lives’.99 As Kate 
Brown observes: 
As spending cuts are made, drawing on notions of vulnerability offers a 
rhetorical means of reassuring the public that those who need and deserve 
services the most will not be affected, thereby bolstering the moral and 
economic credentials of the government.100  
And, 
These politics of vulnerability focus attention on the individual and distract 
attention from the structural forces which expose the different vulnerabilities 
people experience at different times and in different ways that exacerbate 
disadvantage.’101  
But the category ‘vulnerable’ is much smaller than the category ‘dependent’; it 
includes only those classed as vulnerable in law and policy statements and therefore 
everyone not so classed is deemed autonomous. In this way, the politics of 
vulnerability ‘implicitly emphasise […] self-regulation and individual 
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‘responsibilisation …’. 102 In family law matters the label ‘vulnerable’ is restricted 
primarily to the incompetent (those judged incompetent under the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005) or those deemed to be incompetent: children, the elderly or victims of 
domestic violence. It is only they who deserve the now targeted assistance or 
intervention of ‘law’. And, if it is possible, the purpose of that legal intervention is to 
help them to attain or regain their autonomy, to ‘activate’ them as capable citizens, 
unbound by structural constraint.103 
This new discourse of autonomy/vulnerability both gives life to and enables the 
parallel systems of family justice that I have been discussing. In the new dual system, 
state support for the law in family courts is minimal. It is reserved for the vulnerable, 
and its role according to the ‘guiding principles’ of the Family Justice Review, should 
‘be focused on protecting the vulnerable from abuse, victimisation and 
exploitation’ 104  ‘so as to give them the means necessary to enable them to 
participate ‘on a level playing field’105; to be ‘provided with an effective means of 
exercising their autonomy’.106  
In this view the courts have no role in protecting the ‘autonomous’ who it seems are 
either invulnerable to abuse, victimisation or exploitation, or are thought to have 
brought these evils upon themselves and thus be responsible for resolving them 
privately. And of course this theme continues in the LASPO in which the ‘vulnerable’ 
in family justice are either children or victims of domestic violence. As Eekelaar notes, 
‘potential loss of legal entitlements is not sufficient’.107 Family law, therefore, seems 
to be reserved for the vulnerable. For the autonomous, there is freedom from law, or 
as McLaghlin, Chief Justice of Canada called it in the context of upholding as 
justifiable discrimination the exclusion of cohabitants from legal protections 
applicable to married partners, ‘a state-free zone’.108  
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The autonomous thus are steered toward ADR or not-law: the parallel ‘justice’ 
system that is itself autonomous, private and personalised and is designed to 
promote and protect both its own autonomy from the formal justice system and the 
autonomy of its users. This is not to say that some of the autonomous do not do their 
best to use formal law. The state cannot bar litigants in person or the rich from the 
courts if, after having done its best to deter them, those individuals still choose to use 
the formal system. But they are often castigated for doing so; they face admonitions 
from judges about wasting money or damaging their children’s welfare.  
This understanding of vulnerability and of the importance of law to protect the 
vulnerable and/or activate their autonomy may be realistic in many situations, but it is 
the universality of the assumptions and categorisations that is striking. Vulnerability 
and autonomy are constructed in unrealistic and almost fetishized ways reinforcing 
their opposition.  
Why, for example, are domestic violence victims presumed to be vulnerable? 
Many if not most are, but equally many may not see themselves in this way. 
Why are primary caretakers of children or other adults not presumed to be 
vulnerable? Care responsibilities can have a significant impact upon one’s 
financial security and prospects, one’s bargaining power and freedom to 
make choices about how to arrange one’s life. And apart from these crude 
classifications, neither the domestic violence victim, the child, nor the carer 
is either exclusively autonomous or vulnerable. It is more likely each is both, 
as is the person cared for, the non primary carer, the worker and the non-
‘victim’.109  
It seems that family justice policy does not acknowledge that ‘the fact that one 
occupies a position of vulnerability need not deprive one of agency; and conversely, 
the fact that one acted in a way that appears autonomous does not mean that one’s 
autonomy was not in fact circumscribed or impaired by experiences of 
vulnerability’.110  
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Audrey Macklin111 illustrates a similar dualism in her review of private ordering in 
family law in the context of Canadian debates about faith based family arbitration. 
The province of Ontario amended its Arbitration Act in 2006 to prohibit faith based 
arbitration in family matters, primarily on the basis that Sharia would be harmful for 
women. The Province remained unconcerned about other forms of private ordering 
in family matters. In this context, Macklin draws our attention to what she calls the 
‘encultured’ subject who is assumed to require formal legal protection and therefore 
not be able to submit to Sharia, and contrasts her with the liberal subject who does 
not.  
The encultured subject is regarded as intrinsically impaired in her capacity for 
consent because of her cultural embeddedness (and not because of 
contingent vulnerabilities, like immigration status or poverty). Conversely, her 
secular counterpart is recognised as an autonomous subject, unencumbered 
by the cultural influences upon her, or at least able to critically reflect upon and 
detach from them.112 
The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill introduced in the House of 
Lords in 2015 makes similar assumptions about vulnerable/encultured, versus 
autonomous/liberal subjects. This Bill, like the Ontario law before it, deflects 
concern away from the system that coerces private ordering premised on an 
autonomy for some that precludes the possibility of simultaneous vulnerability, 
and presumes therefore no need for the protection ‘law’ offers. At the same time, 
it presumes the vulnerability (without simultaneous autonomy) of others like 
domestic violence victims and encultured women who therefore need law’s norms 
of equality and fairness. Yet, as Macklin’s discussion of the SCC’s Hartshorne 
decision, Canada’s Radmacher, demonstrates, enforcing the ‘autonomy’ of the 
secular, liberal subject might just as easily result in a perverse kind of justice – 
that as she says, ‘instantiate[s] norms that might otherwise appear as retrograde 
or inegalitarian’.113   
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The autonomy/vulnerability dualism in family justice is thus both descriptively and 
normatively problematic. More than that, however, like other dualisms in 
liberalism, the autonomy/vulnerability dichotomy is gendered. 114  This is the 
second difficulty I see with this expression of justice-as-autonomy. While the 
actual autonomous or vulnerable person is not always sexed male and female, 
the vulnerable side of the dichotomy is marked as feminine and the autonomous 
side as masculine. 115  Vulnerability is weakness, passivity and connection; 
autonomy is freedom, action and strength. In this light, the system’s active pursuit 
and promotion of autonomy in, and as, family justice raises yet another and more 
fundamental feminist concern. It elevates an impoverished, ‘male’ idea of 
autonomy not only to default subject status but also to the default ‘neutral’ 
standard of justice. And its ‘other’, an equally impoverished, ‘female’ idea of 
vulnerability becomes a deficit that requires a remedy, usually in the form of 
protection, beneficence, or ultimately and ideally, assistance in 
achieving/activating the valued male form of autonomy. In my view, the system’s 
endorsement in this way of autonomy-as-justice in family disputes is profoundly 
gendered and may ultimately undo many of the recent advances made by formal 
law in women’s and children’s well-being.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As family living is becoming more fluid, diverse and complex, there is more need 
than ever for family law to take seriously its roles both in facilitating an individual’s 
choices in the recognition of that diversity and supporting the legal claims those 
choices may engender. Justice in this situation means as Dingwall says, law 
supplying a framework for and being a party in regulating the exercise of power in 
personal relationships and child rearing in a way that ‘reflects a basic set of 
assumptions about what is equitable in contemporary society.’116 The question, as 
Eekelaar concludes, ‘is not whether law is a sufficient condition for family justice, but 
whether it is a necessary one’.117 I worry therefore about the marginalisation of law 
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or some legal norms from the new framework of the family justice system, in favour 
of only one – an impoverished and gendered understanding of autonomy. The ‘it is 
up to you’ idea of justice is devoid of a theory of power and uses the sophisticated 
and seductive language of autonomy to return family living and therefore family 
justice to the private sphere where the risks and often realities of structural and 
individual inequality are not the law’s concern. It dramatically reduces the role of the 
court from protector of basic principles of fairness, to protector only of (a gendered 
form of) autonomy.   
 
While it is necessary to offer families a range of private and public options to resolve 
their disputes and an increased coordination of services including perhaps a type of 
‘DRIAM’ or triage, 118  do we who are concerned about family justice want the 
dominant message to families to be that their relations are always purely private and 
of no concern to the state or the law? Do we want to tell them that either justice has 
no place in their disputes or that justice means only whatever they, the parties, say it 
means? It seems to me that we must provide a system for those cases that can and 
should settle and for those cases that cannot and should not settle. But crucially, we 
also must provide a system with values that speak to those families who are not 
even in dispute at all and who are simply going about the business of ‘doing family’.  
 
 
 
                                                          
118 See for example, the newly established Family Solutions Court at the Central Family Court in London which 
houses together a contact centre, a pro bono scheme, facilities for mediation and MIAMs, a CAB, a personal 
support unit and a Separated Parents Information Programme. 
